This paper describes the currency board regime operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and assess its performance and sustainability in the context of the economic, political and institutional environment. To the best of our knowledge, our study seems to be unique in this respect. Based on the theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence, we judge that Bosnia and Herzegovina's currency board regime is well-suited and appropriate given the country's history, its current state and its future goals. Nevertheless, we believe that the key to the currency board's sustainability, and an eventual accession to the European Union, is a stronger legal and regulatory infrastructure and a more unified political system.
Introduction
In the seven years since the inception of Bosnia and Herzegovina's currency board (CB), there has been very little discussion on either its operational features or its general success. Most of the existing literature is too generic, often failing to accurately describe the operational features of the recently implemented currency boards 1 , and even more often the literature is too theoretical, attempting instead to determine the relative merits of fixed versus variable exchange rate regimes. Case studies are few and most often lacking in empirical content. Our paper aims to fill in this gap by offering a thorough assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina's CB in the context of its macroeconomic setting, financial markets and political structure.
The CB had been implemented with a goal of achieving the much needed macroeconomic and financial stability that would bring Bosnia and Herzegovina closer to
Europe and eventually into the European Union (EU). The accession into the EU serves
Bosnia and Herzegovina not only as its medium term goal but also provides it with a credible exit strategy. The recent EU accession countries include some euro-based CBs such as Estonia and Lithuania, making Bosnia and Herzegovina's goal all the more attainable and reinforcing the importance of our analysis.
The CB arrangement is judged to be well-suited to the particular economic and political circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has been successful in bringing macroeconomic and financial stability to the region. Nevertheless, the sustainability of the CB and the prospects for future economic growth depend to a large degree on the progress made in improving the legal and regulatory infrastructure as well as increasing the political cohesion within its borders. As Calvo and Mishkin (2003) note, "an informed choice of exchange rate regime requires a deep understanding of a country's economy, institutions and political culture". This is precisely the approach we take in our analysis. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a historical and political background leading to the formation of the CB. Section 2 reviews some of the institutional features of the Central Bank and the laws as they apply to the CB and the 1 An notable exception is a survey of operational features of modern day currency boards by Ho (2002) .
financial system operations. Section 3 evaluates the case for a CB from a theoretical perspective. Section 4 presents some empirical findings and draws on the experience of Bulgaria's CB. Lastly, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks and policy recommendations.
Section 1 Section 2.1 describes the legislation of the CBBH as it pertains to three main features of the currency board rule: the fixed exchange rate; full foreign exchange backing and full convertibility. CBBH's role in administering commercial bank reserve requirements is described in Section 2.2. Finally, CB would not be sustainable without the support of a sound and stable financial system. Section 2.3 documents some of the recent reforms in the financial sector.
Currency Board Arrangement

Fixed Exchange Rate
At its inception, the convertible marka was pegged to the Deutsch mark at parity. The peg was converted to the euro, when the latter came into being, keeping the original exchange rate which amounts to approximately 2 KM per 1 euro.
Full Foreign Exchange Backing
The second CB rule implies that the CBBH must ensure that the aggregate amount of its KM liabilities does not exceed its net foreign exchange reserves (as measured in KM).
The KM liabilities of the CBBH are the KM currency in circulation and the deposits of commercial banks on the books of the CBBH. The net foreign exchange reserves are calculated as the difference between the fair market value of assets and liabilities, as described below. which is a 13.7% increase compared to same month last year.
Full Convertibility
Full (or guaranteed) convertibility of KM, imposes that the CBBH, commercial banks and other authorized financial institutions purchase and sell KM on demand for euro at the specified exchange rate and without any restriction. Of course, without the full foreign exchange backing such rule would not be operational. The law also states that fees, commissions and other charges for the foreign exchange transactions should not exceed one percent of the transaction value. to the law such that the base for calculating reserve requirements was expanded to include both KM and foreign currency deposits. At the same time, the reserve ratio was reduced from 10 to 5 percent and the vault cash ceased to be an eligible asset for the maintenance of required reserves. In December 2004, the reserve ratio was raised back to 10 percent.
The CBBH pays interest to the commercial banks based on the value of their required reserves according to the average interest rate that the CBBH receives, over the same period, on its overnight deposits. Since January 2004, the CBBH has also started paying interest on the excess reserve deposits thereby encouraging commercial banks to increase their cash holdings with the Central Bank. As of December 2004, the rate on excess reserves was fixed at 1 percent.
For those banks who fail to meet their required reserves, a penalty of 5/1000 of the shortfall amount is applied for each day the bank is unable to fulfill its obligations. After the second 10 day period of inadequate reserve fulfillment, the CBBH stops processing withdrawal transactions of this bank and after the third 10 day period, further disciplinary actions are taken which may lead to the withdrawal of the banking license for the institution in question.
The result of these rules and the accompanying changes has been a steady increase in the value of mandatory reserves and consequently an increase in the KM monetary liabilities.
The CBBH evidently feels confident in its ability to fully comply with the full foreign exchange backing as proven through the substantial increases in the free reserves available at its disposal. In the following sections it becomes evident the CBBH is following such a strategy in order to be able to function more like a central bank (implementing more discretionary policy rules) and less as a mere currency board facilitator.
Financial Sector
An essential element of any well-functioning economy is the health of its financial sector.
This is particularly true in the case of a CB due to the monetary authority's inability to (1991) , Estonia (1992) , Lithuania (1994) , Bulgaria (1997) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1997) opted to introduce CBs. Although they were all initiated around the same time, the rules of operation varied from country to country. Camilleri Gilson (2002) and Ho (2002) describe the institutional features of these modern-day currency boards and compare them to their precursors. Williamson (1995) summarizes many of the advantages and disadvantages of traditional currency boards. We take on a similar approach, but instead, where appropriate make reference to the particular form of a CB implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Currency Board Advantages
The advantages of CBs principally derive from the domestic currency confidence and macroeconomic discipline which are the result of the implementation of the strict but clear and transparent rules of operation. In fact, the operational simplicity and the implicit rigour based on this strict, rule-based fixed exchange rate regime is an advantage in itself.
The gains of achieving macroeconomic discipline and currency stability are realized through greater trade and investment which lead to economic growth. Domestic currency confidence is instilled through full convertibility endorsed by the currency board legislation. Full convertibility ensures that any demands for currency conversion are honoured while the high commitment to the peg is made explicit by legislation. Together these two features eliminate any form of exchange rate uncertainty promoting the aforementioned confidence and subsequently enhancing trade, investment and economic growth.
Macroeconomic discipline is instilled through the inability of the monetary authority to monetize fiscal deficits. This is especially important for emerging economies with underdeveloped tax systems and weak capital markets where government deficits are often financed by collecting the seignoriage revenue from increasing the money supply.
Under a CB regime, government's fiscal deficits can not be financed through money creation 6 . The only way to increase the monetary base is by running a current account surplus. Such fiscal discipline stringency is unique to currency boards. While it is widely believed that fixed exchange regimes, through their seignoriage restrictions, provide more fiscal discipline than flexible regimes, Alberola and Molina (2000) conclude that this is not necessarily the case. They make a distinction between monetary seignorage, which is the revenue earned by the Central Bank by printing money and fiscal seignorage which is the revenue accruing to the government from other changes in the Central Bank's balance sheet components. They show that fixed regimes restrict monetary seignorage but not fiscal seignorage and are therefore not as effective in imposing fiscal discipline. Currency boards, on the other hand, effectively restrain both types of seignorage and are thus the most effective in containing excessive fiscal spending.
Another component of macroeconomic stability lies in the low level of inflation observed in CB countries. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1998) find inflation to be, on average, about 4 percentage points lower under CBs than other pegged exchange rate regimes. In particular, since fiscal deficits are not financed through creation of money, this source of inflationary pressure is kept in check. But, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1998) attribute lower inflation mainly to the "confidence" effect which in this context should be interpreted to mean that for a given money growth rate, higher money demand results in lower inflation. Another positive and perhaps surprising finding is that this lower level of inflation is not achieved at the cost of weaker economic growth. In fact, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1998) find that the average annual per capita growth is almost twice as high under currency boards than other floating or fixed exchange rate regimes.
But, this is not all. One of the rarely mentioned but nevertheless important advantages of CBs is the certainty of the payments adjustment mechanism. It works as follows. A payments deficit causes the supply of money to go down which in turn causes interest rates to rise. Higher interest rates, however, attract capital inflows, exert deflationary pressures and improve the current account. Moreover, assuming that prices are sufficiently flexible, the reduced demand pressures will reduce prices and improve competitiveness which will drive the output to increase to its full employment potential without a payments deficit. Fixed exchange rates essentially employ the same mechanism but the exchange rate guarantee of a CB ensures that adjustment costs of interest rate changes are lower. Under a floating exchange rate regime, payments adjustments through currency depreciation come at an even greater cost.
The advantage of setting up a CB in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the existence of a credible exit strategy by joining the EU and eventually the EMU. This is the case for several reasons. Firstly, euro adoption is inevitable if a country is on its road to EU accession so the choice of the currency peg is clearly appropriate. Secondly, EU accession eliminates the major problems associated with abandoning a CB such as a potential currency instability crisis and the loss of monetary policy credibility. And thirdly, a CB entails the right fiscal and monetary policy discipline which is critical in meeting the requirements as set out by the Maastricht (convergence) criteria 7 . Moreover, with regards to the recent accession of two euro-based currency board countries: Estonia and Lithuania, the ECB has indicated that CB set-up is consistent with membership of ERM II. This is contrast to other accession countries which are faced with much more uncertainty associated with ERM II membership.
Currency Board Disadvantages
But, notwithstanding its many advantages, CBs have inherent drawbacks. One of the popular criticisms is the lack of flexibility in altering the exchange rate parity in response to exogenous shocks. This is a classic argument if favour of flexible exchange rates first proposed by Milton Freedman. Under a currency board arrangement, the exchange rate is not allowed to appreciate or depreciate to buffer the economy from external shocks.
However, as Dehejia (2004) points out, allowing the exchange rate to float brings about exchange rate uncertainty and transaction costs that otherwise would not arise. Some of the transaction costs come because the agents are forced to "hedge" against unforeseen and potentially damaging exchange rate fluctuations. This behaviour is costly because it undermines trade and investment growth. Exactly how big these transaction costs are and whether they are potentially more damaging than if such "insulation" effect was not in place remains to be determined but it is fair to say that exchange rate flexibility comes at a price.
Currency boards also entail a much tighter credit policy which, it is widely argued, is detrimental to economic growth. An alternative stance is that it is precisely this inherent monetary and fiscal discipline that is likely to engender confidence in the domestic currency thereby increasing economic growth through the confidence channel. This sort of argument is especially true for a country in a post-war environment where the importance of economic stability is paramount to its development and growth. Moreover, for a country with a history of high inflation and large deficits, monetary and fiscal discipline is imperative if significant progress toward the more stable economic environment is to be made.
And the last, but by all accounts not the least of all drawbacks is the inability of the Central Bank to act as a lender of last resort (LOLR) in the face of system-wide financial crises. Despite how serious and widespread the financial crisis may be, the Central Bank would violate its basic CB precept of full foreign exchange backing if it were to issue domestic currency to provide the necessary liquidity for financial institutions in crisis.
This strict monetary discipline provides many advantages in terms of the credibility of the system which we have already described. However, in this case, it proves to be an undesirable property since the lack of LOLR capability, in addition to not being able to guard against systemic risk, underscores the danger of bank insolvency because depositors will want to secure their assets by investing abroad. But, even if this were not the case, in the event of a loss of confidence, they will seek to convert their demand deposits into the reserve currency and commercial banks must ensure that they have sufficient funds. Commercial banks must either hold enough foreign reserves to meet these demands or they must establish credit lines with foreign banks. In the absence of the exchange rate risk, and provided that the regulatory and licensing rules are compatible, there seems no apparent reasons why foreign banks would not welcome the opportunity to operate in the CB country. The foreign banks operating in the CB country would be in position to draw on resources of their parent banks and thus alleviate some of the illiquidity pressure. Indeed, some foreign bank involvement is already present in Bosnia and Herzegovina (6 of 30 major banks are foreign). Thus, one of the solutions lies in encouraging reserve currency banks to set up branches or affiliates in the CB country.
Another option is for the Central Bank to temporarily relax the commercial bank reserve requirements in order to prevent a credit crunch. In principle, if there exist excess foreign reserves the Central Bank has some room to inject liquidity into the system 8 . Thus, the current lack of LOLR may only be temporary. In fact, Bulgaria (also a CB country; see next section), has already established such an arrangement. Additionally, the involvement of the CBBH in liquidity management and its banking supervision role should be another safeguard against a potential bank run.
Nonetheless, critics of CBs would be quick to point out that CBs are subject to speculative attacks and bank runs and that the Argentine example proves all that. Hanke (2003) and Dehejia (2004) among the many CB proponents, argue that Argentina does not provide compelling evidence against currency boards since it was not running a true currency board, especially in the year before its collapse. One of the deviations from the CB rules was that Argentina did not uphold the required ratio of foreign reserves to its monetary liabilities thus effectively violating one of the main precepts of a CB.
Additionally, some U.S. dollar-denominated assets were counted toward the stock of foreign reserves which later turned out to be a major issue.
But with all its pros and cons, theory alone cannot help us decide on the merits of a particular exchange rate regime.
Section 4: Empirical Analysis
In this section we take on a more practical approach to our assessment of the CB arrangement. Since the above discussion seems to suggest that a CB arrangement seems to be the appropriate exchange rate policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least on the theoretical grounds, it is a natural procession to turn to the empirical evidence to validate this claim. It is important to note here that in 1997 when the CB was established, Bosnia and Herzegovina just emerged from a three and a half year civil war which left close to 250,000 dead, 20,000 missing and 2 million displaced persons. Thus, the task of assessing the performance of the Bosnian CB is better done in the context of a more normative analysis. Nevertheless, we briefly analyze macroeconomic situation, as presented in Table 1 .
The real GDP growth rates are much lower than what we would expect to find in a postwar economy. Economic growth in the last three years has been close to 5 percent and there are no signs of it picking up pace. The growth in 2003 was only 3.5 percent which, under these circumstances, can be characterized as lethargic at best and, although not shown in Table 1 Data unavailability limits us in comparing the pre and post-CB economic performance of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, to aid us in this task, we undertake a simple comparative analysis with reference to Bulgaria's experience with its CB. First, a simple comparison of the main CB features (see Table 2 ) demonstrates the striking similarities between the two CBs. Second, based on the macroeconomic data (see Table 3 Having examined the currency board arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina from an institutional, operational and empirical perspective, we conclude that it has served its purpose well and will likely continue to do so in the future. In retrospect, this was probably one of the most, if not the only, suitable exchange rate regime for Bosnia and Herzegovina in its post-war recovery period. The advantages of implementing a CB were many but the two major ones are its simplicity of rule-based operational design and the macroeconomic stabilization that is implicit in its operational rules. So far, the CB has operated without a major financial or political crisis and in accordance with the main precepts of a CB. This will militate against the possibility an Argentine-style crisis, induced by the violation of CB rules. The Bosnian CB's operational design has been well instituted and is continuously being improved. The transfer of supervisory authority to the CBBH is seen as a step in the right direction as is the potential creation of the lender of last resort facility. The strong legal basis which supports the CB most definitely aides in its credibility and sustainability and can probably be credited for its success.
But, notwithstanding all the positive features that we find with the CB arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there still remains a lot to be done in setting the stage for the EU accession negotiations to commence. Based on the available measures of economic activity, the greatest of the obstacles lies in overcoming the large current account deficit.
The obvious albeit not easy solution to implement is to decrease the trade account deficit by increasing its competitiveness in international trade. This will take time and we cannot expect it to happen quickly as industrial structures have to be first built and then developed. Bosnia and Herzegovina would also benefit from greater FDI inflows so it must make every effort in making the business infrastructure favourable to foreign involvement and compatible with the EU standards. Another potential impediment lies in the political considerations which unfortunately have a way of infiltrating the economy.
In Section 4, we noted the large disparity in inflation rates between the entities. Such political divides also decrease the efficiency of macroeconomic policies and the CBBH operations. If a mechanism were found to minimize the potentially detrimental effects of inter-ethnic political considerations and concentrate instead on economic reconstruction at the federal level, we would likely witness an amelioration of overall economic performance. Unfortunately, political rivalries are inherent in the functioning of the state on all levels, and it is to be hoped that they do not impede the achievement of prosperity for all constituent elements of the federation.
We remain confident, however, that the continued success of Bosnia and Herzegovina's CB regime will be a key determinant of the viability of its future accession to the European Union (EU) and, in particular, to eventual accession to the monetary union, exactly as in the case of Bulgaria. For both Bosnia and Bulgaria, a currency board pegged to the European single currency may turn out to be, as the game unfolds, the trump card that turns the trick. The National assembly appoints the Governor and 3 Deputy Quality of backing Assets: see Section 2 in text.
Liabilities: see Section 2 in text. 
Bank supervision
The CBBH currently co-ordinates BNB regulates and supervises (% GDP) n/a n/a n/a -8.7 -9 -13. 
